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The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors briefly summarize the results of 
previous analyses devoted to such issues of relevance as the ownership structure of privatized 
companies in Poland and how it changed over the course of the 1990s, what factors seemed to 
have  influenced  those  changes,  the  economic  performance  of  these  companies,  and  the 
composition of corporate governance organs such as supervisory and executive boards. In the 
second part, the authors present the results of econometric analysis of the relationship between 
performance and ownership structure evolution, focusing on concentration and the respective roles 
of three types of owners – managers, non-managerial employees, and strategic outside investors. 
In reference to the debate about whether ownership variables are exogenous or endogenous for 
performance, they test both hypotheses concerning the effect of ownership on performance and 
concerning the effect of performance on ownership change.  
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1. Introduction 
Much has been written about privatization in the transition economies. However, little has been 
written about post-privatization ownership changes in privatized companies and what relation such 
changes might have to corporate performance. In this paper we examine the question of post-
privatization ownership changes, or “secondary privatization” – to use a term coined by Barbara 
Blaszczyk – in two groups of Polish companies. The first group consists of over 84 companies from 
the subset of Poland’s 500 largest companies which have been privatized. 
The second group consists of companies privatized by what are often called, for simplicity’s 
sake, employee (or management-employee) buyouts.1 This is a privatization method by which a 
state enterprise is liquidated and its assets leased to a company which by law is to include at least 
half of the employees of the liquidated enterprise. By 31 December, 1998, about one thousand 
state enterprises had been privatized by this method, most of them small- to medium-sized firms, 
usually with less than 500 employees (CSO, 1999; Kozarzewski et al., 2000).  
In this paper we will refer to the two groups of companies as the 84 large companies and 
employee-leased companies, respectively. 
We proceed as follows. First, we briefly summarize the results of previous analyses presented 
in the paper entitled “Corporate Governance and Secondary Privatization in Poland,” where we 
discussed such issues of relevance as the ownership structure of privatized companies and how it 
changed over the course of the 1990s, what factors seemed to have influenced those changes, the 
economic performance of these companies, and the composition of corporate governance organs 
such as supervisory and executive boards (that is, what sorts of organizations are represented on 
supervisory boards, and what the previous occupations of executive board members were). In the 
following  section,  we  present  the  results  of  econometric  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
performance and ownership structure evolution, focusing on concentration and the respective roles 
of three types of owners – managers, non-managerial employees, and strategic outside investors. 
In reference to the debate about whether ownership variables are exogenous or endogenous for 
performance, we test both hypotheses concerning the effect of ownership on performance and 
concerning the effect of performance on ownership change. Finally, we conclude with a summary 
of our results. 
The data used in the analysis presented here is described in the annex. An explanation of 
these labels and the variables is found in the appendix. 
                                                  
1 We would like to thank Maria Jarosz of the Polish Academy of Sciences for kindly allowing us to utilize the data 
base  for  the  employee-leased  companies,  which  was  created  in  a  research  project  conducted  under  her  direction. 
Richard Woodward would also like to thank Iraj Hoshi for his advice concerning the ownership endogeneity analysis, and 
Katarzyna Pietka and Agnieszka Sowa for technical help with that analysis. The usual disclaimers apply.  
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2. Brief overview of ownership, performance and corporate 
governance 
2.1. Eighty-four large companies 
The ownership structure of these companies is highly outsider-dominated: on the average2, 
insiders possessed only 12.7% of shares at the beginning of 1998, and this fell to 11.4% two years 
later. In two thirds of the companies, managers held no shares at all, and other employees held no 
shares in almost half of the companies in the sample. Managers and other employees had majority 
stakes in only 5% of the firms. Foreign investors were the largest shareholders, and they were the 
only shareholder type that gained significantly in 1998-2000 (their average share rose from 19.8% 
at the beginning of 1998 to 26.1% at the beginning of 2000). The second largest type of dominant 
shareholders were domestic private individuals; however, their shares were slowly decreasing. The 
average share of domestic industrial companies grew from 9.2% at the beginning of 1998 to 10.5% 
at the beginning of 2000, while that of financial institutions (banks and investment funds) fell from 
14.6% at the beginning of 1998 to 11.1% at the beginning of 2000. Finally, the state continued to 
hold an average share of about 8%.  
Ownership  concentration  was  very  high  and  growing.  On  average,  the  single  largest 
shareholder held a majority stake, and the five larger shareholders held over 80% of shares. The 
number of companies in which the single largest shareholder held a majority stake was slowly 
growing during the whole period under review. The concentration level was highest in companies 
in which the largest shareholder was a foreign investor. The lowest ownership concentration was 
observed in insider-dominated firms. 
In  2000,  companies  controlled  by  foreign  investors  had  the  largest  revenues,  assets  and 
employment,  as  well  as  the  highest  gross  and  net  profits  and  investments.  Their  exports  and 
research and development (R&D) expenditures were twice as high as the average for the whole 
sample. Companies held by domestic institutional shareholders were also among the largest in 
terms  of  employment,  but  their  revenues  were  relatively  small,  and  on  the  whole  they  were 
unprofitable. However, they were not too far behind foreign companies in investment and R&D 
spending. Companies controlled by domestic outside individuals were smaller than the previous 
group, but basically they were in the same condition. Insider companies were the smallest in terms 
of employment, and had the most consumption-oriented policies, with the largest wage funds, the 
highest  dividends,  and  the  lowest  level  of  investments,  R&D  expenditures  and  exports.  A 
preliminary  analysis  suggested  the  hypothesis  that  performance  is  more  closely  related  to 
dominant  owner  type  than  to  the  level  of  concentration  (a  similar  result,  based  on  rigorous 
econometric analysis, was found in a study of a sample of Czech firms; see Kocenda, Valachy, 
2003). 
                                                  
2 The averages referred to here are not weighted.  
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The average supervisory board composition roughly corresponds to the average ownership 
structure  of  the  companies,  with  some  divergences.  If  we  compare  the  supervisory  board 
representation of insiders to their ownership shares, top managers seem to be underrepresented 
(understandable  given  the  nature  of  the  supervisory  board  as  an  organ  monitoring  top 
management),  while  other  employees  are  overrepresented.  Foreign  investors  are 
underrepresented in companies they control, while in other groups of companies they are rather 
overrepresented.  Banks  are  overrepresented,  especially  in  companies  controlled  by  domestic 
outsiders – both individual and institutional. Thus, in general, the two most powerful groups – top 
managers and foreign investors – tend to be underrepresented, while employees and outsiders are 
overrepresented. This could be interpreted as evidence that the supervisory board fulfills a function 
of representation of stakeholders as well as shareholders.  
Finally, we look at whether top management (executive board members) were recruited from 
within the companies or from outside. One would expect insider elites to be firmly entrenched in 
insider-owned companies, with foreign owners more frequently bringing new expertise to executive 
boards by appointing outsiders. However, the results observed in this sample were very surprising. 
The  relatively  small  number  of  insider  managers  in  insider-owned  companies  is  astonishing  – 
company presidents in insider-owned companies were as a rule outsiders, and in one third of these 
companies there were no insiders in the executives boards at all. By contrast, in more than half of 
the foreign-owned companies, company presidents were of insider origin.  
2.2. Employee-leased companies 
Immediately following privatization, insiders possessed, on the average, 92% of the shares in 
the sample of employee-leased companies, and in 95% of those companies, insiders owned over 
50% of the shares. The share of non-managerial employees in ownership has steadily decreased, 
from  58.7%  immediately  after  privatization  to  31.5%  in  1999.  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that 
despite widespread selling of their shares by non-managerial employees, by 1999 only in 6% of 
firms  had  this  group  of  owners  vanished  completely.  In  most  companies,  non-managerial 
employees retained at least minor blocks of shares. While non-managerial employees were losing 
their  shares,  the  number  of  shares  in  the  hands  of  outsiders  increased  fivefold  (from  7.6%  to 
38.5%). Almost all of them are domestic investors; only three firms have foreign investors (in two 
cases, strategic investors). A large portion of the outsider shares represent concentrated holdings: 
44.4% of the outsider shares were held by owners whom respondents referred to as strategic 
investors. There is also a large group of private firms and entrepreneurs (18.7%).  
Strategic  owners  were  generally  involved  in  the  privatization  of  smaller  than  average 
companies, while the percentage of shares belonging to non-managerial employees at the time of 
privatization  was  generally  higher  in  larger  firms.  By  1999  the  situation  had  changed:  while 
strategic investor presence tended to be noted in smaller firms at the time of privatization, in 1999 
they tended to be present in larger firms. It is interesting to note that in companies that found  
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strategic investors after privatization, top management owned much fewer shares at the time of 
privatization than in the case of those that did not find strategic investors later. 
Earlier studies show that in the first half of the 1990s managers were actively buying shares 
from  non-managerial  employees  and  increasing  their  holdings.3  More  recently,  the  position  of 
managerial staff has stabilized, and in fact they have even begun to lose ground.  
In  the  average  company,  the  single  largest  shareholder  held  over  one  quarter  of  all  the 
company’s shares by 1998. This indicates a fairly large degree of concentration on the average. As 
in the sample of 84 large companies, concentration is growing. 
A number of factors influence the direction and the dynamics of ownership changes, among 
others  sector  affiliation,  company  size,  initial  ownership  structure,  etc.,  but  on  the  basis  of  a 
preliminary  analysis  we  concluded  that  the  most  powerful  factor  determining  the  dynamics  of 
ownership changes in the companies is their economic condition. When a company is doing well, 
the internal relations in the company are stable, and none of the main actors has an incentive to 
undermine this stability. When a company encounters severe economic problems, the actors begin 
to look around for solutions. The most obvious one is to find an external investor who brings an 
injection of fresh capital. When major inside shareholders have to choose between survival of the 
company and preservation of their shares, they tend to choose survival, at the same time trying to 
keep some shares for themselves. When the future prospects of the company are threatened, 
however, non-managerial employees lose every possible motivation to hold on to their shares. In 
earlier studies, a strong positive correlation was discovered between lack of dividends and selling 
of shares by non-managerial employees (Kozarzewski, 1999). In other words, there is preliminary 
evidence for what we refer to as the endogeneity of ownership (see Section 3.2 below). Moreover, 
given the evidence of certain well-known cases of highly successful industrial employee-owned 
companies which were sold to foreign investors or whose shares were quoted on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, one might hypothesize the non-linear nature of this endogenous relationship, with 
very good and very poor performance stimulating ownership changes. 
Management ownership on the average appears in relatively small companies, while strategic 
investors appear in companies whose average employment is above the sample average. This is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that,  given  low  levels  of  personal  savings  at  the  beginning  of  the 
transformation, it was more difficult for an individual or small group of individuals to buy a large 
block of shares in a large company than in a small firm. 
The  financial  results  of  employee-owned  companies  seem  to  be  generally  fairly  sound. 
Profitability indices for the average Polish employee-leased company have been close to – and 
sometimes even better than – the average indices for firms privatized by commercial methods, and 
are much higher than those of state enterprises and firms participating in the NIF program. It is, 
however, worth noting that this profitability index has been consistently falling from year to year. 
                                                  
3 For more, see Gardawski (1996) and Kozarzewski (1999).  
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A  rather  surprising  result  is  the  complete  absence  of  any  correlation  between  various 
measures of strategic investor shares and their growth on the one hand and investment variables 
or  paying  off  the  lease  on  the  other.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  statistical  evidence  that  the 
presence of a strategic investor actually leads to more investment! In contrast, for 1999 (but not for 
1997),  there  is  a  positive  correlation  between  concentration  in  the  hands  of  management  and 
investment spending.  
There is consistently a positive correlation between the value of investment projects and the 
use of credit as a means of financing them, which would tend to support the claims that lack of 
access to credit is one of the main explanatory factors for the low rate of investment in employee-
owned  companies  in  Poland.  Interestingly,  use  of  credit  is  not  correlated  with  size.  However, 
investment  spending  was  positively  correlated  with  the  size  of  the  firm  (measured  in  terms  of 
employment). 
The  membership  of  the  executive  boards  is  dominated  by  persons  who  had  managed  the 
companies before privatization, when they were still state enterprises. Contrary to what one might 
expect in view of the process of ownership “outsiderization,” the position of insiders on supervisory 
boards (measured by numerical dominance in the composition of the boards) remains generally 
strong. At the same time, we do observe a kind of polarization into purely “insider” and purely 
“outsider” boards. 
The supervisory boards tend not to use all the powers given to them by the law and provisions 
of company by-laws. Extension of the supervisory boards’ activities is observed most frequently in 
companies in economic distress. Generally speaking, the small role of owners in the decision-
making process is striking. The owners most frequently act as decision makers where ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of a strategic outside investor. The role of owners in decision-making 
also  grows  in  loss-making  companies  (at  the  expense  of  the  powers  of  the  executive  and 
supervisory boards). Thus, we see that on the whole, the authority of top management is usually 
very strong in these companies, with no other actors challenging them. 
3. Performance and ownership: econometric analysis 
3.1. Productivity and ownership structure 
We  analyze  productivity  here  using  an  augmented  production  function  framework  that  has 
been used in several earlier studies analyzing the relation between employee participation and 
productivity. Ideally, the logarithmized production function estimated is a Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
  ln ln ln V K L Z X it it it it it it = + + + + + a a a a a m 0 1 2 3 4                 
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where V denotes value added, K and L represent capital and labor inputs, respectively, X is a 
vector of industry and enterprise-specific variables such as dummies for the year of production, Z 
is a vector of ownership variables, firms are denoted by the subscript i, the time period in years by 
t, and the residual by m. However, because of difficulties in constructing a measure for value added 
based  on  the  data  available,  and  because  in  a  number  of  studies  of  labor  productivity  in 
transforming economies, researchers have found sales revenues to yield better results than value 
added in econometric analyses of productivity4, we use revenues instead of value added. (We use 
total revenues rather than sales revenues because sales revenues were not available for the 84 
large companies.) 
We estimate the models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques. Table 1 contains the 
results  for  the  entire  panel,  the  84  large  companies  separately,  and  the  employee-leased 
companies separately. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total revenues (LNREV). 
As one would expect, the coefficients of labor (LNLAB) and capital (LNAS) are positive and 
significant. The coefficient for CON1 (i.e., the percentage of a company’s shares held by the single 
largest shareholder) is positive everywhere but significant only in the case of employee-leased 
companies. The coefficient for presence of a strategic investor (SI) is negative except in the case 
of the 84 large companies; however, this coefficient is nowhere significant. We see mixed signs for 
top  management  ownership  (EB)  and  employee  ownership  (EMP);  here  again,  however,  the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. For the employee-leased companies, we have dynamic 
ownership variables showing shifts to states of concentrated ownership, management ownership, 
and ownership by strategic investors. However, none of these coefficients are significant. Similarly, 
none of the coefficients for corporate governance variables (measuring the relative dominance of 
insiders and outsiders on supervisory and executive boards) are significant. Therefore, the only 
reasonably strong result seems to be the positive relationship between revenues and ownership 
concentration in employee-leased companies. 
                                                  
4 See, for example, Brada, Singh (1995), Grosfeld, Nivet (1998), Woodward (1999).  
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Table 1. OLS estimates of productivity effects (using revenues instead of value added) 
Variable  Whole panel  84 large  Employee-leased (1)  Employee-leased (2) 
  Beta  t-statistic  Beta  t-statistic  Beta  t-statistic  Beta  t-statistic 
YEAR  .026  .954  .022  .277  .021  .964  -.020  -.694 
YP  .016  .724  .084  .910  .021  .803  .065  1.858 
E15  -.010  -.424  .200*  2.553  -.059*  -2.301  -.081*  -2.642 
E17  -.061*  -2.685  -.137  -1.868  -.053*  -2.140  -.056*  -2.011 
E18  -.004  -.194  -.014  -.187  .000  .005  -.012  -.515 
E20  .002  .109  -.011  -.153  -.002  -.079  -.017  -.660 
E21      .070  1.052         
E22      .060  .975         
E24      .141*  2.022         
E25  -.089*  -4.604  .002  .026  -.160*  -7.577  -.087*  -3.383 
E26  -.040*  -2.009  -.011  -.158  -.036  -1.736  -.057*  -2.283 
E27      -.006  -.098         
E28  -.033  -1.453  .047  .617  -.034  -1.421  -.011  -.368 
E29  -.023  -1.128  .036  .558  -.009  -.421  -.022  -.878 
E31  -.020  -1.001      -.029  -1.381  -.047  -1.788 
E32  -.036  -1.775  -.091  -1.386  -.036  -1.681  -.011  -.426 
E33              -.008  -.351 
E34  .055*  2.605  .116  1.671  -.006  -.244  -.078*  -2.750 
E35  .014  .702  -.044  -.671      -.011  -.458 
E36      .010  .164         
E37      -.027  -.419         
E45  .026  .934      .009  .306  -.043  -1.161 
E50  .086*  3.909  .268*  3.538  .114*  4.854  .067*  2.329 
E51  .133*  5.473  .186*  2.994  .182*  6.775  .131*  4.253 
E74  -.003  -.109  .010  .164  -.012  -.406  -.055  -1.555 
LNLAB  .044  .958  .101  1.000  .148*  3.279  .164*  3.021 
LNAS  .925*  17.994  .666*  7.114  .802*  17.766  .772*  15.211 
CON1  .025  .946  .063  .787  .132*  3.688  .141*  3.360 
SI  -.014  -.460  .094  1.011  -.057  -1.610  -.078  -1.875 
EB  -.002  -.076  .005  .088  .013  .473  -.005  -.139 
EMP  .028  .891  .130  1.081  .019  .633  .004  .125 
SBINS  .036  .472      .028  .381  -.090  -.924 
SBOUT  .093  1.309  .068  .508  .057  .814  -.052  -.564 
TRCON          .088  1.075  .081  .751 
TRSI          -.082  -1.377  -.104  -1.306 
TRM          -.028  -.437  -.014  -.170 
CHAIR  .030  1.097      .037  1.309  .049  1.422 
PRES  .020  .675          .016  .583 
EBINS  -.100  -1.541      -.090  -1.659     
EBOUT  -.102  -1.510      -.067  -1.183     
  N=193  N=129  N=160  N=219 
  adjusted R
2 = .936  adjusted R
2 = .665  adjusted R
2=.945  adjusted R
2=.889 
Asterisks indicate coefficients which are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  
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3.2. The endogeneity of ownership: The effect of performance on ownership change 
In Section 5.1 we examined the evidence for effects of ownership structure and changes in 
that structure on performance (productivity). However, it is just as likely that performance should be 
on the right-had side of the equation and ownership changes on the left-hand side – that is, that 
new owners emerging or consolidating their shares in the process of “secondary privatization” are 
motivated to do so by the performance of the enterprises in which they acquire control. In this 
section, we attempt to test for the endogeneity of ownership – that is, the hypothesis that economic 
performance determines the ownership structure – by regressing ownership concentration on a 
number of enterprise variables as well as testing a probit model in which the probability of the 
emergence of various types of dominant ownership (dominant ownership by a strategic investor, by 
top management, or by employees) in a given firm is estimated. 
What are the factors which we hypothesize to affect changes in ownership structures? Based 
on previous research on this subject (Demsetz, Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Grosfeld, 
Hoshi, 2003), we hypothesize that the following factors affect ownership changes in the following 
ways: 
Size. We have observed that the larger the firm, the less likely it is to have a concentrated 
ownership structure. On the other hand, certain measures of size – in particular, revenues – can 
provide  an  indication  of  the  size  of  the  firm’s  market,  and  we  hypothesize  that  the  larger  that 
market is, the more likely it will be able to attract a strategic (particularly foreign) investor. We use 
total revenues as our measure of size. 
Risk and uncertainty. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that in a risky market environment, 
monitoring  of  managers  is  more  difficult,  and  therefore  owners  are  more  highly  motivated  to 
acquire controlling stakes in order to have greater control over managers. On the other hand, it can 
be argued that in a riskier environment, investors are more likely to take a portfolio approach, 
investing only in small stakes and thereby minimizing their risk. We use the standard deviation of 
total revenues as the measure of uncertainty. 
Performance. Stated in a simple way, the hypothesis is that the better the performance of an 
enterprise, the more attractive it is for potential investors. However, this statement needs to be 
qualified. Thus, for example, an enterprise experiencing financial difficulties but with a large market 
may be an attractive investment. We have used profitability (the ratio of gross profit to revenues) 
as the measure of performance. Of course, if in analyzing employee-owned companies, we use 
concentration as our measure of ownership transformation, then the positive relationship between 
performance and the attraction of outside investors may appear ambiguous, as these investors 
may appear in the form of strategic investors, increasing concentration, but may also enter the 
company  via  its  quotation  on  the  stock  exchange,  which  may  actually  decrease  the  level  of 
ownership concentration. 
Type  of  shareholder.  Certain  types  of  shareholders  are  more  likely  to  become  strategic 
investors than others; for example, a company in the same industry as the company whose shares  
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are being acquired is much more likely to acquire a majority share than a financial institution. For 
this reason, we include a dummy variable for each of the following types of dominant shareholders 
at the time of privatization: top management, strategic investors, and employees. 
Length of time since privatization. Obviously, the more time has elapsed since privatization, 
the greater the chance that a new investor has appeared or incumbent owners have consolidated 
their holdings. We therefore include the number of years since privatization in the analysis. 
Finally, we include industry dummies (based on two-digit NACE classification), as well as the 
level of indebtedness (measured by leverage, i.e., the ratio of debts – short- and long-term – to 
assets) and the ratio of investment spending to assets as well. 
For each of the variables, the average values for the period 1993-1996 are calculated. Each of 
the financial variables is expressed in constant prices, using CPI deflators for final goods industries 
and PPI indicators for intermediate goods industries. 
In a study of endogeneity of ownership changes in privatized Czech companies, Grosfeld and 
Hoshi (2003) found that one of the key determinants of concentration is the riskiness of the firm’s 
activity; the proxy they used to measure this was the ratio of tangible assets to total assets (based 
on the assumption that the lower the share of intangibles in total assets, the more stable the firm’s 
performance can be expected to be). They found a significant positive relationship between this 
ratio and concentration; in other words, the greater the riskiness, the lower the concentration. They 
also found that larger firms were less likely to have concentrated ownership structures, and that 
corporate investors were more likely to have larger stakes. 
Unfortunately, lack of data prior to 1998 does not allow us to carry out this analysis for the 84 
large companies. We therefore restrict our analysis to the employee-leased companies. 
We  estimate  two  sets  of  models.  In  the  first  the  dependent  variable  is  a  measure  of 
concentration, in the second it is a set of dummy variables indicating transitions from a lack of 
dominant  shareholdings  by  particular  types  of  shareholders  at  the  time  of  privatization  to  their 
dominance  in  the  years  covered  by  the  analysis  (1997-1999).  The  first  model  is  specified  as 
follows. In an OLS regression, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the share of the 
single largest shareholder (CON1/100). The independent variables are:  
·  industry dummies (NACE classification);  
·  the natural logarithm of revenues, in constant 1993 prices; 
·  the standard deviation of revenues, in constant 1993 prices; 
·  the number of years since privatization; 
·  the averages of the following over the previous period since 1993: the investment-to-
assets ratio, leverage (total obligations over total assets), and a measure of enterprise 
performance  based  on  profitability  (different  measures  were  used  in  two  different 
models; see below), and  
·  shares of following types of owners at time of privatization: strategic investor, Executive 
Board member(s), and other employees.  
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In Table 2, we present the estimates of the regressions of the natural logarithm of CON1 on 
enterprise characteristics and performance. In Model 1, for our measure of enterprise performance, 
we use the simple ratio of gross profits to total revenues. In Model 2, in an attempt to identify 
possible non-linear effects of performance about which we speculated in Section 2.2, we use the 
square of the ratio of gross profits to total revenues. On the basis of the results presented here, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the effects of the initial ownership structures are much stronger 
determinants  of  subsequent  ownership  changes  than  are  financial  performance  and  other 
economic characteristics of the firms in the sample. Looking at coefficients which are significant at 
the  95%  confidence  level,  we  observe  positive  and  significant  effects  on  the  concentration 
measure  CON1  for  the  number  of  years  since  privatization  and  the  initial  shares  of  strategic 
investors and executive board members. The only economic characteristic which has a significant 
effect at this confidence level is leverage in model 2 (interestingly, the sign is positive!). If we 
extend the analysis to include variables whose coefficients are significant at 90% confidence level, 
we can add leverage in Model 1 and the riskiness indicator, SDREV, for both models to the list. 
The signs are also positive here. It is worth noting that the implied conclusion concerning the effect 
of riskiness on concentration contradicts the aforementioned finding of Grosfeld and Hoshi (2003), 
though we must remember that the measures – both imperfect proxies – used in the two analyses 
were different. 
Models in the second group (probit models) are specified as follows. The dependent variables 
are dummy variables representing the following transitions:  
·  there was no strategic investor with at least 20% share at the time of privatization, but 
there was one at the time of the observation;  
·  there  was  no  Executive  Board  member  with  at  least  20%  share  at  the  time  of 
privatization, but there was one at the time of the observation, and  
·  there was neither a strategic investor nor an Executive Board member with at least 
20% share at the time of privatization, but there was at least one at the time of the 
observation.  
The independent variables are the same as those reported above for the OLS regressions. 
Tables with the results of the regressions are contained in Appendix 2. As in the case of the 
OLS regressions, for each of the three dependent variables we test two models, one with the 
simple ratio of gross profits to total revenues, and one with the square of that ratio. We will discuss 
the results which are statistically significant.  
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Table 2. OLS estimates of effects of enterprise performance and characteristics on ownership 
concentration 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable  Beta  t-statistic  Variable  Beta  t-statistic 
YP  .188*  2.589  YP  .186*  2.640 
E14  .018  .317  E14  .017  .299 
E15  .105  1.640  E15  .101  1.575 
E17  .038  .491  E17  .040  .527 
E18  -.121*  -2.092  E18  -.121*  -2.081 
E20  -.101  -1.673  E20  -.102  -1.713 
E22  -.016  -.154  E22  -.183  -.777 
E25  -.218*  -3.643  E25  -.229*  -3.768 
E26  .073  1.249  E26  .072  1.238 
E28  -.053  -.797  E28  -.056  -.840 
E29  .050  .702  E29  .048  .684 
E31  -.026  -.375  E31  -.048  -.677 
E32  -.009  -.138  E32  -.013  -.210 
E33  .036  .597  E33  .038  .637 
E34  .048  .680  E34  .050  .715 
E35  -.122*  -2.104  E35  -.122*  -2.112 
E50  -.006  -.082  E50  -.002  -.027 
E51  -.132  -1.846  E51  -.125  -1.758 
E52  .015  .231  E52  .021  .321 
E55  .004  .067  E55  .008  .130 
E60  .038  .612  E60  .041  .672 
E72  .035  .576  E72  .037  .616 
E73  .121  1.705  E73  .124  1.751 
E74  -.118  -1.534  E74  -.116  -1.560 
E80  -.087  -1.142  E80  -.148  -1.406 
PSI  .222*  2.568  PSI  .216*  2.499 
PEB  .196*  2.139  PEB  .189*  2.071 
PEMP  -.098  -.971  PEMP  -.104  -1.037 
LEV  .153  1.663  LEV  .139*  1.991 
GP  .027  .180  GPSQ  .201  .801 
INV  .089  1.105  INV  .085  1.054 
LNREV  .093  1.013  LNREV  .098  1.074 
SDREV  .127  1.865  SDREV  .121  1.781 
N=246 
Adjusted R
2 = .250 
N=246 
Adjusted R
2 = .252 
Asterisks indicate coefficients which are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  
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Transition to dominance by a strategic investor (TRSI) is positively affected by the  amount of 
time elapsed since privatization (YP) in both models, but only at the 90% confidence level in model 1. 
It is also positively affected by the share of employees at the time of privatization (PEMP)5, and by 
leverage (LEV) in model 2, and is negatively affected by gross profitability in model 1. The last two 
results (for leverage and gross profitability) may be indications of a tendency for poor performance to 
stimulate sales of shares by non-managerial employees, as discussed in Section 2.2. 
Transition  to  dominance  by  Executive  Board  members  (TRM)  is  positively  affected  by  the 
amount of time elapsed since privatization (YP) and by investment intensity (INV). 
TRCON is a sort of combined measure of TRM and TRSI, reflecting transitions to dominance 
by either one of these groups, and therefore the results here reflect those for the previous two 
variables. This variable is positively affected by the amount of time elapsed since privatization 
(YP), the share of employees at the time of privatization (PEMP) – albeit only at the 90% level of 
confidence, by leverage (LEV) in model 2, by investment intensity (INV), and by size, as measured 
by LNREV (but only at the 90% confidence level in model 2), and negatively by gross profitability 
(GP) in model 1.  
Finally, if we compare the R
2 statistics for the tests of ownership endogeneity with those for 
productivity, we note that the estimations based on production functions are much better predictors 
of performance than the endogeneity models are of changes in ownership structures. While there 
would seem to be some substance underlying the endogeneity hypothesis, we clearly need to 
refine  our  theory  about  the  determinants  of  ownership  changes  (as  well  as  our  measures  of 
different kinds of ownership transformations, given the possibilities for non-linear and seemingly 
ambiguous relationships discussed above).  
4. Conclusions  
The ownership structure of Polish employee-leased companies, especially immediately after 
privatization, was characterized by large holdings of dispersed insider owners. Subsequently, the 
shares  of  non-managerial  employees  gradually  decline,  while  those  of  outsiders  grow. 
Concentration  of  shares  in  the  hands  of  managers  can  be  seen  from  the  very  moment  of 
privatization. Later, however, managerial holdings stabilize and even decrease somewhat in favor 
of outsiders. 
The  sample  of  employee-leased  companies  is  gradually  becoming  more  and  more 
heterogeneous. We observe three chief directions of ownership structure changes: 
– perpetuation  of  a  dispersed  shareholding  structure,  with  dominance  of  insiders  (an 
approximation of an egalitarian, worker cooperative ownership structure); 
– consolidation of ownership in the hands of insider elites; 
                                                  
5 As we noted in Section 2.2, strategic investors tended to appear in companies in which managers held small 
stakes (and consequently in those companies in which non-managerial employees strongly dominated the ownership 
structure).  
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– concentration of ownership in the hands of outside investors. 
In general, however, change is incremental. Radical changes in the ownership structure are 
rare, and ownership structure seems to be fairly inert. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to conclude 
that significant change is not possible when it is in the interests of the incumbents, as new strategic 
investors had appeared in about 10% of the sample by 1998. (It is, however, worth noting that 
there is a negative relationship between the size of top management’s share and the appearance 
of strategic investors; it appears that once managers have decisive control over the ownership 
structure of a company, they are reluctant to relinquish it.) 
We found little evidence of an effect of ownership structure on performance (measured by total 
revenues). The only statistically significant result is the positive relationship between concentrated 
ownership and revenue performance in employee-leased companies. 
We found little evidence for the effects of economic characteristics of companies on changes 
in the concentration of their ownership structures. The initial ownership structures and the amount 
of time elapsed since privatization seem to have much stronger effects on changes in the level of 
concentration. As for the emergence of strategic owners or dominance of the ownership structure 
by top management, again, the time elapsed since privatization is an important factor positively 
affecting  such  changes,  as  is  a  large  non-managerial  employee  stake  for  the  appearance  of 
strategic investors. The negative relationship between gross profitability and the appearance of 
strategic investors may be an indication of a tendency for poor performance to stimulate sales of 
shares by non-managerial employees. Interestingly, leverage and investment intensity seem to 
positively affect the emergence of strategic investors and managerial dominance, respectively. The 
level of riskiness does not seem to be a factor behind these types of ownership changes. 
In short, with respect to ownership endogeneity hypotheses and the hypotheses concerning 
the effects of ownership structure and its changes on performance, the results here tend to point to 
the following conclusion: that productivity is affected most strongly by the standard components of 
the production function (capital and labor), while ownership structure is most strongly determined 
by ... ownership structure. 
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APPENDIX 1. Data and variables 
Data 
The data for the 84 large companies were gathered in a survey conducted in 2001 as part of a 
project  entitled  “Corporate  Governance,  Relational  Investors,  Strategic  Restructuring  and 
Performance  in  Hungary  and  Poland”  financed  by  the  European  Union’s  Phare  ACE  Program 
(contract  no.  P98-1048-R).  The  companies  were  selected  from  among  Poland’s  500  largest 
companies and had been privatized in the years 1990-2001. 
The data for employee-leased companies were gathered during research conducted by the 
interdisciplinary team headed by Professor Maria Jarosz of the Polish Academy of Sciences in a 
four-year  study  (1997-2000)  devoted  to  direct  privatization  (the  sample  for  this  study  included 
about 160 employee-leased companies).6 
The sample was representative with respect to sector (manufacturing, construction, services, 
trade), size (measured by number of employees) and region, and consisted of 110 firms privatized 
between 1990 and 1996. This constituted 12.9% of the total number of companies privatized by the 
leasing method through the end of 1996. Data were collected using two methods: interviews with 
the main actors in the companies and collection of hard data by questionnaire (these included data 
from  the  balance  sheets  and  financial  statements,  as  well  as  information  on  ownership  and 
corporate governance issues, employment, restructuring, investments, etc.).  
Definitions of variables 
E##  dummy variables for industry (NACE classification, two digit level) 
LNREV  natural  logarithm  of  total  revenues  (in  constant  1993  prices  for  the  endogeneity 
analysis) 
SDREV  standard deviation of total revenues (in constant 1993 prices) over the period of 1993-
1996 for 1997, 1993-1997 for 1998 and 1993-1998 for 1999 
LNLAB  natural logarithm of employment 
LNAS  natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV  average value of leverage (i.e., the ratio of total debts and other obligations to total 
assets) over the period of 1993-1996 for 1997 and 1998 and 1993-1998 for 1999 (we 
were unable to use data for 1997) 
GP  average value of the ratio of gross profit to total revenues over the period of 1993-1996 
for 1997, 1993-1997 for 1998 and 1993-1998 for 1999 
GPSQ  square of GP 
                                                  
6 For detailed discussions of the results of these studies, see Jarosz (1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000).  
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INV  average value of the ratio of investment spending to total assets over the period of 
1993-1996 (we have no data on investment spending for 1997 and 1998) 
CON1  percentage of shares held by the single largest shareholder 
LNCON1  natural logarithm of CON1/100 
SI  percentage of the company's shares held by the strategic investor  
EB  percentage of the company's shares held by members of the Executive Board 
EMP  percentage of the company's shares held by employees (not belonging to the Executive 
Board) 
PSI  percentage  of  the  company's  shares  held  by  the  strategic  investor  at  the  time  of 
privatization  
PEB  percentage of the company's shares held by members of the Executive Board at the 
time of privatization 
PEMP  percentage of the company's shares held by employees (not belonging to the Executive 
Board) at the time of privatization 
TRCON  dummy indicating whether neither Executive Board members nor a strategic investor 
had a share of more than 20% at time of privatization and one or both of these types of 
owners had over 20% in mid-1997 
TRSI  dummy indicating whether strategic investor had a share of less than 20% at time of 
privatization and over 20% in mid-1997 
TRM  dummy indicating whether Executive Board members had a share of less than 20% at 
time of privatization and over 20% in mid-1997 
SBINS  the percentage of supervisory board members who are employed by the company 
SBOUT  the percentage of supervisory board members who are not employed by the company 
CHAIR  a  dummy  variable  with  a  value  of  1  if  the  chairperson  of  the  supervisory  board  is 
employed by the company 
EBINS  the percentage of executive board members who are employed by the company 
EBOUT  the percentage of executive board members who are not employed by the company 
PRES  a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the president of the company was employed by 
the company prior to becoming an executive board member in the 84 large companies 
or employed in the liquidated state enterprise before privatization in the case of the 
employee-leased companies 
YEAR   the year for the data (1997, 1998, and 1999 for the employee-leased companies; 1998, 
1999, and 2000 for the others) 
YP  the number of years elapsed since privatization 
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APPENDIX 2. Probit results 
Dependent variable: TRSI 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Beta  Standard Error  Variables  Beta  Standard Error 
YP  .3717176  .201455  YP  .4684056*  .186662 
E45  -.2659213  .6018546  E45  -.3417664  .5599125 
E51  -1.582521*  .8024448  E51  -1.672695*  .7813665 
E74  -.3455331  .8236787  E74  -1.158343  .7165571 
PEB  -.034628  .0383634  PEB  -.0347124  .0344332 
PEMP  .0328783*  .0136793  PEMP  .0331589*  .0135857 
LEV  .116659  1.900133  LEV  3.243445*  1.391894 
GP  -15.47208*  6.472068  GPSQ  -36.59613  27.68459 
INV  2.037201  3.008095  INV  1.521701  2.586592 
LNREV  .4508864  .3125053  LNREV  .250005  .269997 
SDREV  9.31e-06  .0000485  SDREV  .0000175  .0000447 
CONSTANT  -9.230995*  3.835046  CONSTANT  -10.33248*  3.710879 
N = 157 
Log likelihood = -27.293086  
Pseudo R
2 =.5442 
N = 157 
Log likelihood = -30.142578 
Pseudo R
2 =.4966 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 95% level of confidence. 
Dependent variable: TRM 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Beta  Standard Error  Variables  Beta  Standard Error 
YP  .195153*  .107075  YP  .209071*  .1044268 
E45  .3226083  .632006  E45  .3458331  .6584329 
E51  1.157239*  .6713477  E51  1.202858  .7382229 
E52  2.147117*  .6804387  E52  2.166592*  .7395924 
E72  1.940535*  1.152297  E72  1.983586  1.185735 
E74  .5714299  .6520921  E74  .5426281  .664081 
PEB  -.0114917  .0146358  PEB  -.0125818  .0145694 
PEMP  .0008641  .0091852  PEMP  .0006461  .0093046 
LEV  -.6308196  1.320719  LEV  -.330077  1.09091 
GP  -1.920322  4.726457  GPSQ  -.3344572  27.18271 
INV  4.884594*  2.020344  INV  4.829957*  2.021605 
LNREV  .2573309  .1569174  LNREV  .2502569  .1564342 
SDREV  -.0001043  .0000844  SDREV  -.0001088  .000085 
CONSTANT  -5.114228*  2.11536  CONSTANT  -5.395114*  2.042708 
N = 180 
Log likelihood = -59.695586 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.2327 
N = 180 
Log likelihood = -59.778568 
Pseudo R
2 =.2316 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 95% level of confidence.  
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Dependent variable: TRCON 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Beta  Standard Error  Variables  Beta  Standard Error 
YP  .22135*  .0940813  YP  .283986*  .0909822 
E45  .1592096  .480547  E45  .1851834  .4615085 
E51  -.0746151  .5425913  E51  -.1077107  .5554177 
E52  1.170059*  .5589208  E52  1.00814  .5603349 
E72  .7716108  1.050993  E72  .7425104  1.052649 
E74  .2229696  .5341435  E74  -.1425281  .4906152 
PEB  -.0090501  .0149918  PEB  -.0130646  .014418 
PEMP  .0138286  .0080055  PEMP  .0137306  .0080533 
LEV  -.0103815  .9979478  LEV  1.782148*  .7949507 
GP  -10.68851*  4.01597  GPSQ  -12.18949  19.25507 
INV  3.99472*  1.757969  INV  3.285604*  1.633644 
LNREV  .2796222*  .1423512  LNREV  .2290985  .1387386 
SDREV  .0000206  .0000351  SDREV  .0000114  .0000333 
CONSTANT  -5.682625  1.820558  CONSTANT  -6.971307*  1.765485 
N = 180 
Log likelihood = -73.206408 
Pseudo R
2 = .2917 
N = 180 
Log likelihood = -76.970407 
Pseudo R
2 =.2553 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 95% level of confidence. 
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